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UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA
(UNOMSA): SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 772 (1992) AND
894 (1994) AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSITION:
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND PEACE-KEEPING
Muna Ndulo"
1. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the implementation of Security Council
resolutions 772 and 894 on the question of South Africa adopted by the
Security Council on 17 August 19921 and 14 January 19942 respectively.
Resolutions 772 (1992) and 894 (1994) were adopted, by the Security
Council, to assist the people of South Africa in their transition from
apartheid South Africa to a non-racial, democratic society and to help them
stem the political violence and conflict that plagued the country. 3 History
has shown that any profound political transformation is bound to provoke
resistance and tensions and consequently bring about conflict. It is desirable
to ease tensions and to remove the sources of conflict before they result in
violence and jeopardise the process of transformation. 4 In many situations
where tension exists, the main problem is not so much the existence of
tensions but the possibility that when conflicts break out they are
* LLB (Zambia); LLM (Harvard); D.Phil (Oxon); Legal Officer, International Trade Law
Branch, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations; Formerly, Senior Political Adviser to
the Chief of Mission (UNOMSA); Senior Political Adviser to the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for South Africa; Professor, University of
Zambia and Visiting Professor, Cornell Law School.
1 Security Council resolution, S/RES/772 (1992), 17 August 1992.
2 Security Council resolution, S/RES/894 (1994), 14 January 1994.
3 Violence was considered as the single biggest threat to the democratic process in South
Africa. See, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in pursuance of
Security Council resolution 765 (1992), S/24389, 7 August 1992 and also Security
Council resolution, S/RES/765, 16 July 1992. See also, Goldstone Commission, Report
of the Inquiry into the Police Response to, and Investigation of Events in Boipatong on
June 19, 1992, issued on 20 July 1992.
4 See, Douglas G. Anglin, Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1993-1994, Carleton
University, June 1994.
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mismanaged so as to lead to spirals of negative sanctions to the detriment
of all the parties involved in the conflict in the worst case or that the
conflict becomes generalised to the extent that a conflict in one area of
interaction blocks the possibility for the parties involved in the conflict to
find mutually beneficial solutions in other areas of human interaction.
In the 1990s, violence and political conflict in South Africa had reached
alarming proportions and threatened to derail the country's
transitional process from apartheid South Africa to a democratic
and non racial society. 5 The Security Council expressed grave
concern at the escalating violence, which was causing heavy loss of
human life. It was also concerned at the consequences of the
violence for the peaceful negotiations aimed at creating a
democratic non racial and united South Africa. It was further
concerned that the continuation of the situation in South Africa
would seriously jeopardise peace and security in the larger
Southern African region. 6 The United Nations went into South
Africa in September 1992 to work with the Government, political
parties and local peace institutions such as the National Peace
Accord7 structures in taking measures to reduce the level of
violence and encourage progress in the constitutional negotiations
and the transitional process. With regard to its work with local
structures, the United Nations involvement in South Africa was an
example of the fruitful co-operation that can be achieved between
the international community and local peace initiatives. This could
serve as an example for other areas of conflict elsewhere in the
world where such co-operation might be applicable. It was also
The period 1990-1991 cost the lives of more South African black citizens than any
previous two year period. See, Proceedings of the South African Association for
Conflict Intervention, Fifth Annual Conference on Negotiation and Mediation in
Community and Political Conflict in South Africa, 25-28 November 1992, University
of Port Elizabeth. A fairly reliable source of statistics on violence was the South
African Human Rights Commission. The Commission issued a Monthly Repression
Report.
6 Security Council resolution, S/RES/765 (1992), 16 July 1992.
7 The National Peace Accord was adopted in 1991. It was a church led initiative to
address political violence. Most political parties endorsed the Accord. Even the PAC
and AZAPO, which had not participated in the working groups that elaborated the
Accord, gave qualified endorsement to the Accord. Parties on the white right such as
the Conservative Party did not participate and did not endorse its product. See M.
Cleary, Democratic Values in South Africa the Second Track, paper presented at the
Fifth Annual Conference on Negotiation and Mediation in Community and Political
Conflict in South Africa, 25-28 November 1992, University of Pretoria.
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perhaps the first major United Nations initiative on preventive
diplomacy i.e. taking measures to prevent the outbreak of conflict.
For ease of treatment of the subject at hand, the article is divided into
two parts.
Part I focuses on resolution 772 and Part II on resolution 894.
PART I
RESOLUTION 772: PEACE BUILDING
2. THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACE KEEPING
In "Agenda for Peace"8 , published in January 1992, the United Nations
Secretary-General analyses and makes recommendations on ways of
strengthening and making more effective and efficient within the
framework of the Charter, the capacity of the United Nations to engage in
preventive diplomacy, peace keeping and peace making. The Secretary-
General observed, that since the creation of the United Nations in 1945,
over 100 major conflicts around the world had left some 20 million people
dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of
these crises because of the vetoes cast in the Security Council, 279 in all, a
vivid expression of the divisions of that period. Coincidental with the end
of the cold war, only one veto has been cast since 31 May 1990.
Meanwhile, demands on the United Nations, have grown. There were 13
peace related operations between 1945 and 1987, and 15 between 1988 and
1992. Costs jumped to 3 billion US dollars in the year ending 1992 alone.
Since then, several other expensive peace missions have been undertaken.
These include missions in former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti and
Rwanda. The UN presence in the former Yugoslavia alone costs close to
five million dollars a day. The United Nations' security arm, now
unencumbered by the veto, has emerged as a central instrument for the
resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace.
9
In Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General described the aim of the
United Nations in relation to the preservation of peace as follows: to seek to
identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict,
8 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 1992. See also Boutros-Ghali, A
Supplement to an Agenda For Peace, 1995.
9 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, supra.
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and to try, through preventive diplomacy, to remove the sources of danger
before violence erupts; where conflict erupts, to engage in peace keeping
aimed at resolving the issues that have led to the conflict; and finally
through peacekeeping, to work to preserve the peace, however fragile,
where fighting has been halted and to assist in peace building, that is,
implementing agreements achieved by the peace makers. In brief,
"preventive diplomacy" means taking actions that are aimed at easing
tensions before they result in conflict, or if conflict breaks out, to act
swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive
diplomacy requires the taking of measures to create confidence between
parties to a conflict; it means early warning of impending conflicts based on
information-gathering and informal fact-finding; it may also involve
preventive deployment and in some situations may involve the creation of
demilitarised zones.
Peace making is in between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and
keeping the peace. This involves efforts to try to bring hostile parties to
agreement by peaceful means. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter
sets out a comprehensive list of means that may be adopted to resolve
conflicts. These have been amplified in various declarations adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly, including the Manila Declaration of
1982 on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes and the 1988
Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations
which may threaten International Peace and Security and, on the role of the
United Nations in this field. They have also been the subject of various
resolutions of the General Assembly, including resolution 44/21 of 15
November 1989 on enhancing international peace, security and
international co-operation in all its aspects, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations.
At a further level, peace-keeping is when conflict has broken out and the
United Nations intervenes in order to assist in keeping the peace. The
nature of peace-keeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years. The
established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded
flexibly to new demands. The basic conditions for the success of a peace
keeping operation, however, remain unchanged. These are: a clear and
practical mandate; co-operation between the parties implementing the
mandate governing the operation; continuing support of the Security
Council; readiness of Member States to contribute to the United Nations,
military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required for
the operation; effective United Nations command at headquarters and in the
field; continuous analysis and reassessment of the underlying causes of the
conflict; contact and open lines of communication between peace keepers
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and the role players on the ground in the conflict; adequate financial and
logistic support for the operation and the willingness of the parties to a
conflict to settle the conflict. Without these minimum conditions a peace
keeping mission is bound to fail. to
3. CONDITIONS NECESSITATING THE DEPLOYMENT OF
UNOMSA
UNOMSA represented the first stage of peace-keeping. The Mission
was deployed to contribute to the prevention of the outbreak of conflict.
The concept of the Mission, despite the level of political violence that
plagued South Africa at the time of the conception of the Mission, was
preventive diplomacy. Outright civil war had not broken out. In 1989
various parties in South Africa, including the Government and the African
National Congress (ANC), committed themselves to a negotiated political
settlement of the conflict in the Country. 1' The international community
lent its support and encouragement with the adoption in August 1989 of the
Harare Declaration by the Ad Hoc Committee on South Africa of the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was endorsed by the General
Assembly on 14 December of the same year in its "Declaration on
Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa". 12 The
issue and challenge for UNOMSA, therefore, was how to ensure that the
transition to non racial, democratic rule would be peaceful and would not
be derailed by political violence.
On 2 February 1990, President De Klerk, as a result of increased
international and domestic pressure, announced the release of Mr. Nelson
Mandela and other prominent political prisoners. The Government also
announced the unbanning of several political organisations including the
ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the South African
Communist Party (SAPC).13 It further announced its intention to repeal
10 Ibid.
1 President de Klerk committed his government to the dismantling of the system of
apartheid in an address to Parliament on his assumption of power in 1989. The ANC
had already committed itself to negotiations as it always argued that its armed struggle
was a result of the South African Government's refusal to negotiate an end to apartheid.
12 General Assembly resolution, A/RES/44/27B, 22 November 1989. This was not a new
position on the part of the OAU. See, Manifesto on Southern Africa adopted by
Leaders of East and Central African States, Lusaka, Zambia, 14-16 April 1969.
13 See, South African Government publication, The Process of Political Negotiation,
1990-1993: A brief Overview and Evaluation,1 June 1995.
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apartheid and emergency legislation. 14 During 1990 and 1991,
discriminatory legislation constituting the pillars of apartheid-the Land Act,
Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act-was repealed. 15
Negotiations initially took the form of talks about negotiations, primarily
between the ANC and the Government/National Party (NP). 16 Formal
constitutional negotiations on the future of South Africa commenced in
December 1991 with the establishment of the Convention for a Democratic
South Africa (CODESA).17 Despite the positive atmosphere of the talks
and progress made in some areas, agreement on the crucial issue of a new
constitutional dispensation eluded the parties and the talks broke down.
18
Constitutional negotiations resumed on 5 March 1993 in the newly-formed
Multiparty Negotiating Forum. 19
The start of the negotiations in 1991 witnessed an unprecedented
escalation in political violence.2 ° Thousands of people were killed in
conflicts across the country. Political violence became the greatest threat to
the transition process. There was widespread speculation that the violence
was being orchestrated by a "third force" and the possibility can not be
discounted that there were at least some loosely knit groupings of
disaffected members of the various security forces in the country,
mercenaries or right wing elements that were behind some of these
14 Ibid.
15 See, South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey, 1990-1991,
1991.
16 The first ANC/ Government meeting was in May 1990. The ANC and the Government
agreed on the removal of the obstacles to negotiations which were identified. The talks
resulted in the Grote Schuur Minute of 4 May 1990 and later meetings resulted in the
Pretoria Minute, aimed at facilitating the Commencement of substantive negotiations.
This process was continued later to overcome deadlocks in the transition e.g. The
Record of Understanding Agreement, September 1992, concluded between the
Government and the ANC.
17 South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey 1990-1991, supra.
18 ibid.
19 The talks involved most political organizations with a measurable constituency. See,
The Process of Political Negotiation 1990-1193: A brief Overview and Evaluation, 1
June 1995, and also Lisa Thornton, The Structural Transition to Democracy in
Government in South Africa, Institute for Democratic Alternative for South Africa,
(IDASA), 1993.
20 For instance, the South African Human Rights Commission, Monthly Repression
Report (HRC), April 1993. The HRC recorded 528 incidents of politically related
violence for the month of April alone. 266 of those incidents were related to the
national wide reaction to the assassination of Chris Hani. The number of deaths for the
month totalled 259. See also South African Human Rights Commission, Monthly
Repression Report, March 1993. It reported that the March death toll was 182.
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attacks. 21 Government denials of such collusion were severely undermined
in July 1991 with the exposure of classified documents by the Weekly
Guardian which revealed that the security police had paid R250,000 to
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to organise anti ANC rallies after Nelson
Mandela's release from prison. The Government also admitted that the
police had given the IFP aligned trade union, United Workers Union of
South Africa (UWUSA), a sum of R1.5 million over a four year period.22
Government denials were further undermined by revelations in the
Goldstone Commission report of March 1994 which implicated senior
police officers in gunrunning and third force activities.2 3 A closely related
phenomenon was the inability or unwillingness of the security forces to
contain the violence. Political party rivalry made it easy for provocateurs or
criminals to exploit the situation. There were a considerable number of
areas where political party rivalry rendered free political activity
impossible. In Natal/KwaZulu open conflicts erupted between ANC and
IFP supporters. Throughout the country key elements in the violence were
the conflict between hostel dwellers and residents of surrounding
townships, train violence and taxi violence. Recurring themes in relation to
the violence were political rivalry between the ANC and IFP, allegations of
security force involvement in the violence, political intolerance, poor police
community relations, right wing violence and the failure of the police to
investigate, apprehend and prosecute perpetrators of political violence in
the townships. 2
4
21 The Government was accused of pursuing negotiations while at the same time
encouraging violence in order to weaken the ANC which had demonstrated
overwhelming popular appeal especially in the black community. These suspicions
were confirmed by the Goldstone Commission. The Commission reported the
involvement of senior police officers in third force activities. See, Commission of
Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Report to the
International Investigation Team, April, 1994 and also Commission of Inquiry
Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, 18 March 1994. In the
March report Goldstone named three senior police generals as being implicated in the
illegal activities which included the supply of illegal weapons, arms and ammunition.
See also Mail Guardian, Newspaper, Vol 11, No. 28, July 7-13 , 1995. See also
Preliminary -Report of the Transitional Executive Council Investigation Task Group
into the Matter of Hit squads in the KwaZulu Police, flowing from the Fourth Interim
Report of the Goldstone Commission, dated 6 December 1993.
22 The disclosures were made by the Weekly Guardian in 1991.
23 The Goldstone Commission Report, March 1994.
24 In a report on political violence in South Africa, published in June 1992, Amnesty
International concluded that "the police have passively and at times actively colluded
in IFP attacks on people believed to be ANC supporters and that the principle aim of
the police appears to have been to perpetuate conflict and prevent peaceful transition",
see, Amnesty International, Southern African Report, Vol 10, No. 23, June 1992.
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4. THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA
The United Nations had been involved in the question of South Africa
from its inception. In the very first session of the General Assembly in
1946-at which decisions were taken that led to the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights-a complaint was lodged by India
against South Africa's increasing discrimination against people of Indian
origin.25 However, the first General Assembly resolution specifically aimed
at apartheid was adopted in 1952.26 Between 1948 and 1966 the General
Assembly regularly appealed to the South African Government to
reconsider its apartheid policies.27 The period after 1960 was marked by an
increasingly more determined approach by the General Assembly as well as
by the beginning of the involvement of the Security Council in the matter.
The International revulsion which followed the killing of 68 peaceful
protesters in Sharpeville in March 1960 prompted the Security Council to
adopt its first resolution deploring the killings of unarmed and peaceful
demonstrators at Sharpeville who were protesting racial discrimination and
segregation in South Africa and actions of the Pretoria Government. 28 In
November 1962, the General Assembly for the first time recommended
specific diplomatic and economic measures to press the South African
Government to abandon apartheid. 29 In 1963, the Security Council called
25 General Assembly resolution, A/RES/44 (1), 8 December 1946; Letter dated 12 July
1948 from the representative of India to the Secretary-General Concerning the
treatment of Indians in South Africa, A/577, 16 July, 1948: General Assembly
resolution, A, A/RES/395 (V), 2 December 1950.
26 General Assembly resolution, A/RES/616/A/(VII), 5 December 1952. The General
Assembly established a Commission consisting of three members to study the racial
situation in the Union of South Africa in the light of provisions of Article 1, paragraph
2 and 3, Article 13, paragraph 16, Article 55 C, and Article 56 of the Charter, and the
resolutions of the United Nations on racial persecution and discrimination, and report
its conclusions to the General Assembly at its eight session.
27 See, General Assembly resolution, A/RES/616 (VlI), 5 December 1952; General
Assembly resolution, A/RES/1598 (XV), 13 April 1961 and General Assembly
resolution, A/RES/1761 (XVll), 6 November 1962.
28 Security Council resolution, S/RES/134 (1960), 1 April 1960.
29 General Assembly resolution, A/RES/1761 (XVII), 6 November 1962. It requested
States to break off diplomatic relations with the Government of South Africa and close
their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag and boycott South African goods
and refrain from exporting goods and refuse landing rights and passage facilities to all
aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa. It also established a special
committee to keep the racial policies of South Africa under review when the Assembly
was not in session and requested the Security Council to take appropriate measures,
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on all States to cease the sale and shipment of arms to South Africa. 30 In
later years the range of sanctions widened and included: the Oil embargo
and the sports and cultural boycott. 31 During this period the condemnations
of apartheid grew stronger. 32 In 1973 the General Assembly declared
apartheid a crime against humanity.3 3 South Africa's intransigence
eventually led to the suspension of its credentials and which in turn led to
its non participation in the work of the General Assembly until after the
rehabilitation of South Africa in the international community after the 27
April elections in 1994.34
Between 1989 and 1992, the Secretary-General undertook a number of
initiatives to assist the parties in South Africa in bringing about an effective
end to violence and in creating conditions for negotiations leading towards
a peaceful transition to a democratic, non racial and united South Africa. 35
These initiatives included the dispatch of United Nations staff members to
observe the week of mass action organised by the ANC Alliance in August
1992.36 The Mission established in 1992,37 however, represented the most
immediate result, of the Security Council's consideration of the situation in
South Africa at the request of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and
including sanctions, to ensure South Africa's compliance with the resolutions of the
General Assembly and the Security Council on this subject.
30 Security Council resolution, S/RES/181 (1963), 7 August 1963. See also Security
Council resolution, S/RES/148 (1977), 4 November 1977, which imposed an arms
embargo.
31 General Assembly resolution, A/RES/44/27K, 22 November 1989. See also General
Assembly resolution, A/RES/44/27H, 22 November 1989.
32 General Assembly resolution, A/RES/43/ 50 D, 5 December 1988 and General
Assembly resolution, A/ RES/2923 E (XXVII;) 15 November 1972.
33 General Assembly resolution, A/RES/3068 (XXVIIl), 30 November 1973.
34 In resolutions 2636 A (XXV) of 13 November 1970 and 286 (XXV1) of 20 December
1972, and 3207 (XXIX), 30 September 1974 and its decision of 5 October 1973 the
General Assembly rejected the credentials of South Africa. This led to the ruling by the
President of the General Assembly, Mr. Abdelazi Bouteflika (Algeria), that South
Africa should not participate in the work of the Assembly. A/PV.2281, 12 November
1974.
35 See for instance, General Assembly resolution, AIRES/44/27 K, 22 November 1989
and Report by the Secretary-General on Progress made in the implementation of the
Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa. The
report includes a statement by Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the African
National Congress, in the Special Committee against Apartheid on 22 June 1990.
36 See, United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), First Quarterly
Report, September to December, 1992.
37 Ibid.
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the subsequent adoption of Security Council resolution 765 on 16 July
1992.38
Resolution 765 was adopted following the Boipatong massacres on 17
June 1992. It, inter alia, invited the Secretary-General to appoint a Special
Representative for South Africa in order to recommend, after discussion
with political parties in the country, measures which could assist in
bringing about an effective end to the political violence that plagued the
country and in creating conditions for negotiations leading towards a
peaceful transition to a democratic, non racial and United South Africa. 39
Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General,
appointed Mr. Cyrus Vance as his Special Representative for South Africa.
Mr. Vance visited the country from 21 to 31 July 1992. On 7 July 1992, the
Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council on the basis of
Mr. Vance's discussions with a wide range of political players and parties
in South Africa.
40
5. RESOLUTION 772 (1992)
After considering the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council
adopted resolution 772 of 17 August 1992.41 In resolution 772, the Security
Council inter alia authorised the Secretary-General to:
"deploy, as a matter of urgency, United Nations Observers in South Africa,
in such a manner and in such numbers as he determined necessary to
address effectively the areas of concern noted in his report, in co-
ordination with the structures se' up under the National Peace Accord" 42
The Security Council also invited the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU), the Commonwealth and the European Union (EU) to deploy their
own observers to work in close co-operation with those of the United
Nations.43 The deployment of observers by the Commonwealth, the OAU
and the EU in South Africa and the United Nations deployment of
38 Security Council resolution, S/RES/765, 16 July 1992. See also letter dated 13 August
1992 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal and
Chairman of the Organization of African Unity.
39 Security Council resolution, 765, ibid.
40 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in pursuance of Security
Council resolution 765 (1992), S/24389, 7 August 1992.
41 Security Council resolution, S/RES/772 (1992), 17 August 1992.
42 Supra, paragraph (4)
43 Supra, paragraph (8)
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UNOMSA was probably the first time that these four inter governmental
organisations worked together in an international operation. The
organisations deployed joint teams of observers in the field and planned
common approaches to problems. This method of work greatly increased
their credibility and effectiveness in their dealings with South African
institutions and political parties as it meant that the four intergovernmental
organisations spoke with one voice on the problems confronting the South
African transition. 4
Deployment of United Nations observers started with the arrival of the
first 13 observers on 13 September 1992.45 By October 1992 the United
Nations had established a team of observers in all 11 regions into which the
country had been divided under the National Peace Accord and by
November 1992 the full compliment of 50 observers had been deployed.
The figure was increased to 100 in December 1993.46 The OAU,
Commonwealth and the EU deployed an average of 18 observers each. The
United Nations policies regarding the specific areas in which observers
were to be deployed was to a large extent based on the level and incidence
of violence in various parts of the country.47 The Pretoria
/Watersrand/Vaal(PWV) and KwaZulu/Natal areas remained the most
volatile regions through out the mission period and were consequently
allocated a higher proportion of observers than other parts of the country.
Under resolution 772, UNOMSA, as already observed, was intended to
render assistance to the people of South Africa as a whole in their
legitimate struggle for a non-racial, democratic society. This assistance was
given in two principal ways:
44 United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa(UNOMSA), Third and Fourth
Quarterly Report, September to December, 1992.
45 See statement by spokesman for Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali Concerning
loss of life in Ciskei, and details on the United Nations Observer Mission in South
Africa (UNOMSA), UN Press Release, SG/SM/4807-SAF/141, 9 September 1992. See
also United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), First Quarterly
Report, September to December, 1992. The Mission was led by Ms. Angela E.V. King
as Chief of Mission.
46 United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), Third and Fourth
Quarterly Report, June to December 1993.
47 Ibid.
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a) by working with South Africans to address areas of concern
relevant to the question of violence in South Africa, including the
issues of the hostels, dangerous weapons, the role of security
forces and other armed formations, the investigation and
prosecution of criminal conduct, mass demonstrations and the
conduct of political parties; and reporting thereon to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations; and
b) by helping strengthen mechanisms set up under the National
Peace Accord, so as to enhance their capacity in the building of
peace, both in the present and in the future.
48
UNOMSA sought to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that
could lead to conflict and tried to remove the sources of danger before
violence erupted. It also examined weaknesses and engaged in institutional
building in order to support and strengthen the peace structures set up under
the National Peace Accord.
6. NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD
The Peace Accord Structures were set up as a result of an initiative by a
group of concerned church and business leaders who on 22 June 1991
convened a preparatory meeting of all the major church and business
leaders in the country, to develop an agenda for the way forward49 for
South Africa in the wake of the violence engulfing the country. The
meeting resolved to adopt the National Peace Accord. After the preparatory
meeting, the original facilitators were joined by representatives of the major
political parties apart from the white right wing political parties. These
groups collectively considered the topics identified at the preparatory
meeting as needing attention if the flow of violence was to be stemmed.
The groups recommended the adoption of a code of conduct for political
parties and institutions, a code of conduct for the security forces, the
creation of an institutional framework for social-economic development
and the development of mechanisms for the monitoring and implementation
of the various codes and the Peace Accord itself.
The Accord was adopted on 14 September 1991. It sought to combine
two of the most important aspects of conflict resolution by negotiation, by
48 Security Council resolution, S/RES/772 (1992) 17 August 1992.
49 The National Peace Accord was signed on 14 September 1991. On 4 November 1992,
The Internal Peace Institutions Act, No. 135 of 1992 came into operation.
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securing the parties endorsement of and commitment to important and
relevant common values, which were intended to provide a transcendent
reference point for the settlement of future disputes, and to comprise at
least part of the foundation of a future national political culture in a
democratic society. The Peace Accord adopted the various codes
recommended by the preparatory meeting and also established a joint
process of implementation, monitoring and enforcement of the agreements
reached under the Peace Accord in which all parties were represented. This
ensured that no party was asked to place itself at the mercy of others in the
application, interpretation and organic development of the agreement and
that each retained "ownership" of and commitment to the process. In all the
structures of the Accord, all political parties that wished to part cipate were
represented. The attainment of the widest possible participation was the aim
of all the structures.
At the heart of the Accord were the code of Conduct for political parties
and organisations and that of the security forces. These codes were derived
from explicitly liberal democratic values and were aimed at the guarantying
of the rights of the individual, recognising the essential role of political
parties as mediators in a democratic political process, respecting their
political activities in facilitating the expression, aggregation and
reconciliation of the views and interests of different segments of society,
and recording their obligation to refrain from incitement to violence and
hatred. The National Peace Accord structures and UNOMSA and the other
observer groups pressed for a clear and explicit commitment - not mere lip
service - to compliance with the code of conduct for political parties and
organisations by the leaders of political parties and with the code of
conduct for the Security forces by the Government and the security forces.
This was central to the success of the Accord and the effectiveness of the
operations of the observer missions. Each of these institutions was pressed
to ensure that its members, followers, or persons for whom it was
responsible complied in full with the provisions of the relevant code and
that violations by its members were roundly criticised and punished where
appropriate. UNOMSA made representations to political parties and
security forces to protest violations of codes. It must be admitted that
political parties found it easier to condemn wrongful activities of their
members than to mete out punishments to them. The important point in
such situations though, is that no political party likes to look bad. This is an
important factor in the effectiveness of codes of conduct.
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7. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE NATIONAL PEACE
ACCORD
(i) Key Institutions
The National Peace Accord drew upon three key structures for its
effectiveness as a consensus frame work. These were the National Peace
Committee, the National Peace Secretariat and the Commission of Inquiry
Regarding Public Violence and Intimidation (popularly known as
"Goldstone Commission" after its chairperson). 50 The National Peace
Committee supervised the Peace Process in keeping with the provisions of
the National Peace Accord. The National Peace Secretariat was responsible
for organising, servicing and financing the network of regional and local
peace committees whose on going grassroots efforts were key to the
successful implementation of the National Peace Accord. The Goldstone
Commission had the responsibility of investigating causes and acts of
violence and making recommendations as to measures to be taken to reduce
the level of violence. The Commission issued a number of very important
reports and made a significant contribution to exposing the underlying
causes of the political violence that plagued the country. 51 The National
Peace Accord established Local Peace Committees in as many communities
as possible through out South Africa.
5 2
The peace committees served as community forums for the discussion of
community concerns relating to all aspects of life in the community, in
particular, policing, community development and political activity. At
meetings of the committees all role players in the community were
represented. This included the political parties, police, the army, trade
unions, civic organisations, women groups, youth groups and other
community based organisations. The Committees also served as forums for
the resolution, through mediation, of community disputes and for
formulating joint responses to issues confronting the community such as the
provision of utilities and other services to the communities. In addition, the
peace structures trained thousands of monitors to monitor and control
crowds at public meetings and thereby prevent the development of
conflicts. The National Peace Accord structures played a vital role in the
transition period in South Africa especially in addressing the question of
50 See, Report National Peace Secretariat, November 1992 to 30 April 1993.
51 See, e.g. Report of the Inquiry Into The Police response to, and Investigation of, Events
in Boipatong on 17 June 1992, issued on 20 July 1992.
52 Report National Peace Secretariat, November 1992 to 30 April 1993.
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violence. They became a vital forum for mediation efforts between political
parties, and between various communities in conflict. With regard to
political parties that did not participate in the constitutional negotiations,
e.g. Azania Peoples Organisation (AZAPO), they became the only forum
for discussing their concerns about the South African process. Later, during
the elections, many of the officials of the peace structures served as
elections officials and monitors and put to use the skills they had learnt and
contacts they had developed under the National Peace Accord structures to
the great advantage of the conduct of the election process.
(ii) Social and Economic Reconstruction Committees
The drafters of the Peace Accord realised that a lasting peace is
conditional on meeting pressing basic needs of the people within the
communities. These ranged from the provision of food, clothing, shelter
and public amenities, to the generation of employment opportunities,
training for new skills and capacity building for local communities. The
Social and Economic Reconstruction and Development Programme
(SERD),53 an arm of the National Peace Accord focused on socio-economic
reconstruction and development. Concerted efforts were exerted in various
regions to establish regional and local SERD committees and appoint
regional co-ordinators, through out South Africa particularly in the
Pretoria/WitwatersrandlVaal (PWV) and KwaZulu/Natal regions which had
suffered most destruction from political violence. These structures,
unfortunately, were not always well equipped to mobilise resources,
especially in terms of generating local interest and political support for
project formulation, planning and implementation and in identifying
appropriate sources of funding. Political violence made it very difficult for
communities to work together. There was also an electoral aspect, in some
communities, project assistance from the NP Government was perceived as
campaigning on the part of the NP. SERD committees, never the less,
became important structures in which strife torn communities could work
together in community projects and through work get to know each other
and develop tolerance for each other.
53 National Peace Accord, supra.
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8. UNOMSA'S ROLE AND ACTIVITIES
(i) Observing Political Events and Flash Points
UNOMSA observers with monitors from the peace structures attended
and observed mass actions and other forms of political activity, as well as
the work of the South African Police Defence Forces related to those
activities. One way in which the rise in violence was addressed was to
ensure that security forces and political organisations alike abided by the
respective codes of conduct as outlined in the National Peace Accord, as
well as by the Guidelines established by the Goldstone Commission on the
conduct of marches and political gatherings. 54 As pointed out earlier these
codes were designed to ensure that the security forces and political
organisations abided by certain minimum standards in their conduct thereby
reducing that part of violence or the likelihood of violence 55 that emanated
from clashes between the police and members of the public engaged in
political activity. In addition to marches and other forms of political
activity, UNOMSA observers visited potential flash points of violence and
observed efforts aimed at resolving conflicts and bringing peace to troubled
areas. Observers supplemented these field observations by establishing and
maintaining informal contacts at all levels with formal government
structures, political parties and organisations, as well as community-based
"alternative structures" such as civic associations. These contacts
underscored the importance of the peace structures and strengthened the
notion that all these groups had to seek common ground for resolving
problems. In those instances where observers noticed problems which,
unless resolved, could lead to violence, they offered advice on how to
resolve the problems and avert such situations developing into violence. 56
Obviously, observing events offers an easier and less problematic role.
Intervening and offering advice, either on the initiative of the observer or
on request at the scene, could be fraught with difficulties and therefore had
to be approached with care and only after weighing all the factors involved.
It had to be done judiciously and in a manner which preserved UNOMSA's
54 Goldstone Commission Guidelines on Marches and Political Events for Political
Parties, 1992.
55 The Codes were developed with the participation of all relevant organizations e.g
security forces and political parties. They were written in the form of mandatory
provisions.
56 United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa(UNOMSA) First Quarterly Report,
September to December 1992.
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impartiality and did not impair its ability to be of assistance to all parties in
the South African political spectrum in future.
The mission issued guidelines to all the observers with regard to the
method of work57 and observation of political activity. Observers tended to
offer their assessment of any given situation solely to the representatives of
the peace structures and other community leaders present at the event.
Observers also communicated their assessment of the conduct of the parties
and security forces to UNOMSA headquarters as well as to the security
forces themselves. The Chief of Mission and her headquarters staff,
evaluated the reports. The more serious ones were brought to the attention
of the relevant ministries, the political parties, the police commissioner and
the National Peace Secretariat for follow up action. Observers played a very
active role in the work of the peace structures. A purely passive role would
not have been in line with the letter and spirit of resolution 772 (1992).
Moreover, a purely passive role would have failed to live up to the
expectations of the people of South Africa who expected the United
Nations to assist them in the removal of obstacles to the transition to a
democratic society. It would also have led to frustration and negative
attitudes with regard to the role of the United Nations and its presence in
South Africa.
(ii) Strategies for Combating Violence
In its work UNOMSA developed several strategies for combating
violence and dealing with flash points of violence. It found for instance that
major incidents of violence could be reduced and even totally avoided at
marches/rallies and other public events if there was effective pre-planning
of events involving all the parties (organisers of the event, the police and,
members of the Local Peace Committees), with the aim of drawing up
detailed plans about matters such as routes to be used by marchers,
numbers of marshals and peace monitors, measures to contain flash points
and arrangements regarding the dispersal of crowds after the event. During
the event, and at the end of the marches or public meeting if there was strict
compliance with plans and agreements reached by all the parties concerned,
followed by a debriefing session attended by all concerned parties to
evaluate the situation and learn from the event. UNOMSA also emphasised
the need for a close working relationship between the leaders of the
57 UNOMSA, Guidelines on the Implementation of Resolution 772 (1992). See also
UNOMSA, Planning and Preparations for Public Marches and Demonstrations,
Guidelines for UNOMSA Staff, 15 June 1993.
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community, the peace structures and the police.58 It focused its attention on
encouraging the Government to act on issues it considered important in
relation to the reduction of violence. The list included: urging the
Government to enact legislation which prohibited the carrying of dangerous
weapons in public; public destruction of weapons confiscated or collected
from the public in an effort to reduce the prevalence of weapons in the
community 59; and the dismantling of special units of the army which had a
reputation for involvement in violence. In part, as a result of the persistent
insistence of UNOMSA, on March 7, 1993, the 31 Battalion, a
controversial unit from the South African army, which was composed
mainly of San people from Namibia, was officially disbanded and on 26
March 1993, the 32 Battalion, a similarly controversial unit from the South
African army, which was composed mainly of Angolans from the former
Front For the Liberation of Angola Army (FLNA), was disbanded. Both of
these battalions had been implicated by the Goldstone Commission and by
the public in political violence. Their disbandment became a key United
Nations demand.60
9. STRENGTHENING THE PEACE STRUCTURES
As pointed out earlier, the second aspect of Security Council resolution
772 called upon UNOMSA to assist in the strengthening of the peace
structures set up under the National Peace Accord6 1 This aspect of the
mandate was interpreted by UNOMSA to mean that it should look for ways
and means to strengthen Peace Accord institutions. Where appropriate
therefore, UNOMSA Observers, made suggestions, on how best to ensure
that the Peace Accord structures function effectively. This included
examining the weakness of the structures and pointing out ways and means
of improving and strengthening them. An obvious weakness of the Accord
was that not all parties and interest groups were signatories to the Accord.
58 United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa, Second Quarterly Report, January to
April 1993.
59 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in pursuance of Security
Council resolution 765 (1992),S/24389, 7 August 1992, listed the prevalence of
dangerous weapons as one of the ares of concern. See paragraph, 68.
60 Resolution 772 (1992), supra, expressed concern at the existence of special forces and
other armed formations in South Africa and recommended that the Goldstone
Commission investigate their operations. See also, Report of the Secretary-General on
the question of South Africa, S/25004, 22 December 1992.
61 Security Council resolution, S/RES/772 (1992), paragraph, 7.
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These included several political parties to the left and the right of the
political spectrum and some of the homelands. As part of its efforts to
strengthen the Peace Accord structures, UNOMSA held several meetings
with these parties in an effort to bring them into the structures of the
Accord. UNOMSA made suggestions on ways and means of dealing with
breaches of the Accord. UNOMSA urged broader participation in the
leadership structures of the Peace Accord. It urged more women and a
greater role for the black population in the leadership of the structures.
UNOMSA pressed the Government to provide adequate funding for the
peace structures to enable them to do their work effectively. A special
relationship developed between the Goldstone commission and UNOMSA
and the other observer missions. The Commission's independence and
standing was visibly reinforced by the presence of EU police observers
among its investigators and the support it received for its recommendations
from UNOMSA and other international observer missions. UNOMSA
seconded a jurist on a full time basis to work with the Goldstone
commission. 62 The record of implementation of the Commission's
recommendations by the Government was unsatisfactory and remained a
matter of concern in discussions between UNOMSA and the Government
throughout the mission period. On several occasions the Mission brought
this matter to the attention of the Government and complained about it
publicly. 63
10. UNOMSA AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION
UNOMSA played a pro-active role in the SERD process. UNOMSA
observers shared their research, documentation and knowledge with local
communities bringing in relevant experience in development from other
areas. The strategy of the mission was to encourage the generation of
development at the grassroots level. Therefore, planning structures, were
encouraged to allow maximum participation, at all stages of development,
from assessment, through planning to management and implementation.
They were also encouraged to develop local capacity, including the use of
local materials, labour force, consultants; all within the context of
appropriate cultural values. UNOMSA believed that only then, would the
people identify with the development process as their own, and provide all
62 See, United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) Third and Fourth
Quarterly Report, June to December 1993, 1993.
63 Ibid.
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the required support to ensure its successful implementation. One of the
Mission's strengths was the wide variety of nationalities and professional
disciplines represented among the members of its staff. This enabled
observers to share experiences from different countries with their South
African counterparts. Not only was the Mission's acknowledged
impartiality enhanced by the different perspectives observers brought to
their work; they could also often present a variety of options based on their
diversity for dealing with problems faced by the peace structures.
In summarising the discussion on resolution 772, one can conclude that
resolution 772 played an important role in addressing political violence in
South Africa in the pre-election period and thereby helped to facilitate the
transition process. The presence of international observers was the
expression of the interest shown by the entire international community in
the democratisation process in South Africa. UNOMSA lived up to the
expectation of the Secretary-General. In his report to the Security Council
in August 1992 on the role of the International Community in South Africa,
the Secretary-General observed that "the role of the international
community and of the United Nations in particular, at this time, can be
profound and beneficial. It can facilitate a great and peaceful transition of
historic proportion in a part of the world that has suffered too long". 64
Under its expanded mandate in accordance with Security Council
resolution 894 (1994), UNOMSA continued its peace building activities
related to the reduction of violence. Observers continued to assist and
cooperate with the National Peace Accord Structures while carrying out
their electoral responsibilities. As the electoral period progressed, observers
expanded their work to include electoral assistance and expanded their
network of contacts to include the Monitoring Directorate of the
Independent Electoral Commission.
64 See, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in pursuance of Security
Council resolution 765, S /24389, 7 August 1992, paragraph, 89.
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PART II
RESOLUTION 894 (1994)
11. UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTORAL
ASSISTANCE
The United Nations does not get involved in national elections unless
there has been a specific request from the country involved for United
Nations electoral assistance. General Assembly resolution 46/137 defined
the involvement of the United Nations in electoral verification as an
exceptional activity of the organisation. In the report of the Secretary-
General submitted to the Assembly at its forty-sixth session
(A/46/609/Corr/. 1 and Add. 1-2), four criteria were suggested which should
be satisfied if an eventual United Nations mission were to be considered.
The criteria is as follows: (a) requests should pertain primarily to situations
with a clear international dimension and which may relate to the
maintenance of international peace and security; monitoring provided by
potential United Nations activity should cover - geographically and
chronologically - the entire electoral process, from the initial stages of
registration through the elections themselves; there should be a specific
request from the Government concerned as well as broad public and
political support for a United Nations role; (d) approval should be provided
by the competent United Nations organ. The South African situation had no
difficulty in satisfying the four criteria required by the United Nations.
There was overwhelming support for United Nations monitoring of the
South African elections from the international community, all major South
African political parties and the South African public in general.
The major focus of United Nations involvement in elections has been to
monitor the elections in order to ensure that they are free and fair. The
holding of free elections injects substance into the principle with regard to
elections established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article
21 of the Universal Declaration states that "everyone has the right to take
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives". 65 It adds that: "the will of the people shall be the basis of
the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
65 The International Bill of Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted and
proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (1ll) of 10 December 1948, article
21.
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elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held
by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. '66 In Namibia in
1989 and Angola in 1992 the United Nations developed and applied
standards that moved beyond this limited formula to a wider one that
ensured that the elections occurred in a free environment and in the context
of administratively fair rules. A consensus was developed as to what
constitutes free and fair elections. The most important of these standards
are: (1) a right of all voters to participate in the electoral process without
hindrance (2) free campaigning for all political parties (3) secrecy of the
ballot; (4) reasonable speed in the counting of ballots; and (5)
accountability and openness of the electoral process to the competing
parties and (6) an acceptable electoral law. 67
12. APPROACHES IN MONITORING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
There are two basic approaches to the observation of elections. The first,
is to provide for the presence of an observer in each polling station at all
times during the election. This is referred to as "total" observation of
elections.68 The second approach is to provide for an observer at a sample
of polling stations for short periods of time at different times. The results
observed or verified in a sample of adequate design can then be
extrapolated to the universe of polling stations. In the case of total
observation the number of observers is unambiguously determined by the
number of polling stations. As should be obvious, total observation is
extremely expensive, since it will usually involve a large number of
observers. Since as will be suggested below, adequate sampling can
produce about the same level of certainty in relation to the adequacy of the
conduct of the polling, the option of total observation is essentially
political, and its use can be attributed more to its symbolic importance than
to specific technical considerations.
Observation in sampling is based on mobile units, with two observers in
each unit. The units will visit a variable number of polling stations through
out polling day. The number of observations will depend on the number of
mobile units and observers, the difficulties of travel between sites and the
66 Ibid.
67 See, a publication of the Washington D.C. based National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs: National Building; The UN and Namibia, 1990, p. 26 .
68 Angela E.V. King, Remarks on the Role of International Observer Missions in South
Africa, Financial Mail Convention on "Election Countdown" World Trade Centre,
Kempton Park, Johannesburg, August 1993.
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length of time spent by the observers at each polling station. Given the
characteristics of some of the phenomena being observed the size of the
sample is not statistically significant. This is particularly the case with
direct observation. Fraud will not take place during the short period when
the observers are present, but before or after their arrival. This fact
highlights the third and most essential conclusion about "sample"
observation: that is the indispensable presence of trained electoral officers
and party poll watchers in every polling station; without their presence,
even large numbers of international observers will make little difference.
With the presence of local poll watchers, a few international observers can
make an impact well beyond their numbers. This means that political
parties must train party election watchers in large numbers to work with the
international observers. The aim of every political party should be to have
party election watchers at every polling station. This was encouraged in the
South African election and was achieved in large measure. The party poll
watchers act as the first line of observation. They will report their
observations to the international observers. In this respect, it is more
effective for the United Nations to encourage and sponsor the training of
party poll watchers than engage in the total observation strategy. In South
Africa the United Nations strategy was sample observation. The relatively
large numbers of observers available meant that observers had a small
number of polling stations to cover and were able to make more frequent
visits to polling stations that were also longer in duration.
13. RESOLUTION 894 (894) AND ELECTORAL OBSERVATION
The request for electoral assistance from the United Nations by South
Africa was made in December, 1993. On 7 December 1993, South Africa
took a major step towards the achievement of the goal of a democratic
society. The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) was established. 69 This
was after the Negotiating Council of the Negotiating process and its
Plenary had approved on 18 November the last of the two pieces of
legislation that formed part of the package adopted on 1 April 1993 by the
Multiparty Plenary as necessary to implement the transition to democracy
69 The Structural Transition to democracy in Government in South Africa, Institute for a
Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA), publication. The TEC was
established to level the political playing field for the elections. It was to serve as a
check to the Government. It operated through a number of sub committees e.g Defence,
Law and Order, Finance, Foreign Affairs etc.
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in South Africa.70 The two documents approved on 18 November 1993
were the Interim Constitution and the Electoral Act. The others - the
Transitional Executive Council Act (TEC), the Independent Electoral
Commission Act (IEC), the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act (IBA)
and the Independent Media Commission Act (IMC) were passed on 23
September 1993. The main objective of the TEC was to facilitate, in
conjunction with existing legislative and executive Government structures
at national, regional and local levels, the transition to, and preparation for,
the implementation of a democratic system of government in South Africa.
At its first meeting on 7 December 1993, the TEC endorsed a resolution
adopted the previous day by the Multiparty Negotiating Council which
inter alia, requested the United Nations to provide a sufficient number of
international observers to monitor the electoral process and to co-ordinate
the activities of the international observers provided by the OAU, EU and
the Commonwealth, as well as those provided by Governments.
71
14. THE MANDATE IN RELATION TO ELECTIONS
As a result of the acceptance by the UN to the invitation of TEC to
observe the South African elections, 72 the mandate of the Observer Mission
was expanded by resolution 894 of 14 January 1994 to include election
observance. The mandate of UNOMSA in respect of the observation of the
elections was spelt out in paragraphs 56 to 59 of the 10 January 1994
Report (S/1994/16) of the Secretary-General Concerning Arrangements for
United Nations Monitoring of the Electoral Process in South Africa and
Co-ordination of Activities of Internal Observers 73 and agreed to by the
Security Council by its resolution 894 of 14 January 1994. Specifically,
paragraph 57 proposed that under its expanded mandate, UNOMSA would
be required among other things, to: (a) observe the actions of the
Independent Electoral Commission and its organs in all aspects and stages
of the electoral process and verify their compatibility with the conduct of a
free and fair election under the Independent Electoral Act and Electoral
70 See, UNOMSA, Quarterly Report, January to April, 1993.
71 See, Report of the Secretary-General Concerning Arrangements for United Nations
Monitoring of the Electoral Process in South Africa and Coordination of Activities of
Internal Observers, A/48/845-S/1 994/16,10 January 1994.
72 Security Council resolution, S/RES/894 (1994), 14 January 1994. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi
was appointed to head UNOMSA as the Secretary-General's Special Representative for
South Africa.
73 Ibid.
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Acts; (b) observe the extent of freedom of organisation, movement,
assembly and expression during the electoral campaign and ascertain the
adequacy of the measures taken that political parties and alliances enjoy
those freedoms without hindrance or intimidation; (c) monitor the
compliance of the security forces with the requirements of the relevant laws
and decisions of the TEC; (d) verify the satisfactory implementation of the
depositions of the Independent Media Commission and the Independent
Broadcasting Authority Acts; (e) verify that voter education efforts of the
electoral authorities and other interested parties are sufficient and will result
in voters being adequately informed on both the meaning of the vote and its
procedural aspects; (f) verify that qualified voters are not denied the
identification documents or temporary voters cards that would allow them
to exercise their right to vote; (g) verify that voting occurs on election days
in an environment free of intimidation and in conditions which ensure free
access to voting stations and the secrecy of the vote; (h) verify that
adequate measures have been taken to ensure proper transport and custody
of ballots, security of the vote count and timely announcement of results;
and (h) co-ordinate the activities of observers from international
governmental organisations and foreign Governments so as to ensure that
they are deployed in an effective and co-ordinated manner; establish
effective co-operation with South African and Foreign non-governmental
organisations, which would also monitor the electoral process. 74
15. OBSTACLES TO A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION AND THE
REASON FOR INTERNATIONAL MONITORING
The South African elections needed international monitoring for several
reasons. This was the first ever democratic election in which all citizens
who qualified to vote were eligible to participate. There was an absolute
need to ensure that the election was not only free but was seen to be free
and fair if it was to be accepted by all political factions in the country as
well as by the outside world in view of the difficulties under which the
election was to take place. These difficulties included: the historical lack of
a democratic culture of political tolerance in the country; unabating
violence of an increasingly vicious and callous nature, the likelihood of
intimidation, bias, suspicion and outright hostility to the idea of universal
74 Report of the Secretary-General Concerning Arrangements for United Nations
Monitoring of the Electoral Process in South Africa and Coordination of Activities of
Internal Observers S/1994/16, 10 January 1994.
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suffrage on the part of some political factions especially those on the right
and a new and unfamiliar electoral system. These factors, created suspicion
and doubt about the integrity of the process and made it essential that the
elections be monitored by the outside community to reduce the probability
of any of the losing parties challenging the elections results.
Added to that, were substantial, though not insurmountable practical
obstacles to the conduct of free and fair elections in South Africa.75 These
could be divided into two broad categories; the first were those pertaining
to the logistics of mounting the first country wide democratic elections in
South Africa, and the second were those posed by violence and
intimidation. There was also a widespread perception that the police force
is partial in South Africa. The problem was heightened by an institutional
culture which tolerated a profound disrespect for human rights and black
life, most evident in the choice and use of lethal weaponry and ammunition
against demonstratiors and in the treatment of prisoners in custody. 76 The
situation was worse with regard to homeland police forces. They were
extremely partisan in their approach to policing and were often used to
frustrate free political activity. The perceived partiality of the various police
forces was a major problem in the election period in that it made them
unsuitable to guard the polling stations and perform other election related
functions such as transporting ballot papers. Of equal importance was the
perception on the ground of political bias by election officials associated
with the Department of Home Affairs.
Although problems of violence and intimidation tended to overshadow
more seemingly mundane concerns, the potential logistical difficulties
should not be under estimated. As late as three months before the elections
there were for instance approximately 4 million eligible voters in the
homeland States that were still being prevented from obtaining identity
cards that were essential for voting. Additional hurdles to the efficient
registration of the eligible voting population were an unnecessarily
75 For a discussion of the problems, See United Nations Observer Mission, Third and
Fourth Quarterly Report December 1993; Report of the Secretary-General Concerning
Arrangements for United Nations Monitoring of the Electoral Process in South Africa
and Coordination of Activities of International Observers, A/48/845-S/1994/16, 10
January 1994. See also a Publication of the International Commission of Jurists, voting
for Peace, An Independent Assessment of the Prospects for Free and Fair Elections in
South Africa, November, 1993; and also Goldstone, Prevention of Election Violence
Inquiry, 1993. Shortly before the elections the Commission constituted a special
international panel to make recommendations on preventing violence during the
elections.
76 See, Laurie Nathan, Police Deviance in the 1990s, Centre for Intergroup Studies,
August 1992.
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cumbersome process, including overly long application forms, and the
inaccessibility for rural and homeland residents to officials issuing identity
documents. Finally the undue delays in the re-incorporation of the
homeland states, especially Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, resulted in a good
numbers of potential voters in these regions being excluded from the
election and preparations for elections in those regions being unduly
hampered.
The situation with respect to the homelands dramatically changed as
elections neared. The Bophuthatswana administration led by Lucas
Mangope had repeatedly rejected participation in the elections. The result
of the Mangope administration's intransigence was a popular uprising,
accompanied by many deaths and extensive destruction of property, which
culminated in the regimes overthrow. The Bophuthatswana crisis
reverberated in other homelands where demands and concerns were similar.
Oupa Gqozo, the leader of Ciskei, resigned under pressure on 22 March
1994.
16. OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY
The Mission developed its own plans for the observation and
verification methodology.77 In relation to the observation called for in
paragraph 57 (a) of the report of the Secretary-General of the actions of the
LEC, a distinction was drawn between the central preparations by the IEC
for the election, which were monitored from the headquarters of the
Mission, with extensive liaison with the IEC on issues of concern; and the
IEC's field preparations, which were monitored by field staff, in
accordance with guidelines developed centrally. 78 Monitoring of field
preparations focused specifically on: establishment by the IEC of essential
field structures; choice of premises for voting stations and provision of staff
and equipment for voting stations. Observation of the extent of freedom of
organisation, movement, assembly and expression was undertaken by field
staff of UNOMSA, in accordance with precise guidelines which drew
heavily on the extensive experience gained with such observation by
UNOMSA under its activities pursuant to resolution 772 prior to the
77 A Democratic, Non Racial and United South Africa, Final Report of the United
Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the United Nations
Secretary-General, 26 May 1994. International voting was managed by the Electoral
Assistance Unit (EAU) in New York, with extensive assistance from UNDP offices
and United Nations information centres.
78 Ibid.
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expansion of its mandate. Verification of the sufficiency and effectiveness
of the voter education process, non denial to voters of identity documents
which entitled them to vote were undertaken both centrally and by field
staff of the Mission.
79
UNOMSA faced significant difficulties in that many of its tasks were
directly dependent on the performance of the IEC. For example, the legal
framework for the election continued to undergo changes until literally days
before the commencement of polling: the critical amendments to the
Electoral Act of 1993 providing for the inclusion of the IFP on the ballot
via the attachment of stickers to ballots, were made only five days before
the polling commenced. 80 The operational plan contained in 10 January
1994 report (S/1994/16) of the Secretary-General called for deployment of
almost 2,000 United Nations observers during the election period. The
staged deployment of additional observers proceeded rapidly: an additional
200 observers were deployed by the end of February 1994; a further 200
United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) brought the total UNOMSA presence in
South Africa by the end of March 1994 to 500 observers, deployed in a
total of some 60 locations reflecting IEC operational locations. Also, it
should be noted that bilateral agreements were concluded between the
United Nations and Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland for the
provision by their Governments of electoral observers for UNOMSA.
The final phase of deployment came during the period 17- 20 April
1994, when a total of 1,485 additional election observers joined UNOMSA.
The OAU deployed 102, Commonwealth 118 and the European Union 322.
During the elections, observers fielded by the intergovernmental observer
missions, working in co-ordination with UNOMSA totalled 2579
(including UNOMSA's 1985 observers). Several NGOs, many of them
from the United States and Europe, fielded hundreds of observers. The final
phase of deployment of UNOMSA observers caused tremendous logistical
difficulties to UNOMSA. It is unrealistic to expect a Mission to brief and
deploy 1485 election observers in a period of less than a week. The
deployment was a logistics nightmare. It is also doubtful that the observers
who came one week before the elections made a useful impact. It might be
better for the United Nations to spend more money in technical assistance
to countries that ask for electoral assistance than sending at the last minute
79 Ibid.
80 A series of initiatives by the Government,the ANC and mediators aimed at including
the IFP in the elections resulted in a breakthrough a week before the elections, when on
19 April , the IFP announced that it would participate in the elections. Part of the Right
Wing led by General Constand Viljoen decided to participate in the elections in March
1994. General Viljoen registered a new party the Freedom Front.
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a large number of observers. The money spent on the last batch of
observers could have been usefully spent on the training of marshals,
monitors, party poll watchers, election officials and generally increasing the
capacity of South African authorities to conduct the elections. The
Commonwealth and the EU missions run extensive training programmes in
these fields and made tremendous impact on the electoral process. The
United Nations had no budget whatsoever for training. This was a serious
shortcoming of the UNOMSA mission.
17. COORDINATION WITH COMMONWEALTH, OAU AND EU
MISSIONS
Under both resolution 772 and 894 the United Nations was specifically
required to co-ordinate the activities of the other intergovernmental
organisations (paragraph 8 of resolution 772 and preamble to resolution
894). The TEC in its request for UN electoral assistance had also requested
the UN to co-ordinate the activities of the international observers provided
by the OAU, Commonwealth, EU as well as those provided by
governments (S/1994/16). In carrying out its initial mandate under
resolution 772, UNOMSA worked closely with the observer missions of the
Commonwealth, the EU and the OAU.81 Regular joint meetings, were held
both at UNOMSA headquarters and in the field. The four missions
exchanged information on developments throughout the country, planned
joint deployments of observers for major events and co-ordinated their
activities to ensure maximum coverage of developments throughout the
country. Regular consultations among the missions also resulted in
common positions and action-oriented decisions regarding particularly
important developments or issues. Decisions were made regarding
approaches to individuals or groups in order to express the international
community's concerns, or to outline possible options for dealing with
problems. Representatives of the international observer missions met
regularly, for example, with the Executive of the National Peace
Secretariat, the Commissioner of Police and the Minister of Law and Order
to evaluate such matters as police community relations, unnecessary use of
force by security personnel, as well as improvement in police recruitment
procedures and training. The international observer missions, working
81 The Missions for instance issued joint press statements on a variety of issues e.g final
statement of the elections and the statement deploring the violence that occurred in
central Johannesburg during a Zulu March in support of King Zwelethini, 29 March
1994. See also election eve message, 25 April 1994.
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together, became an important conduit for information from ground level to
reach decision makers in government, political parties and the security
forces regarding situations which could have exacerbated tensions or led to
violence. The average South African and the political parties used this
avenue to the fullest extent, and in some instances to communicate with
each other when relations between particular communities or parties were
particularly bad.
Once UNOMSA's expanded mandate was approved, co-ordination
mechanisms were modified and enhanced in accordance with the proposals
contained in the 10 January 1994 report (S 1994/16) of the Secretary-
General to the Security Council. Co-operation between UNOMSA and the
other international observer missions through these structures proved very
constructive. A co-ordinating Committee comprising the heads of the
observer missions of the UN, Commonwealth, the OAU, and the EU was
set up under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the United
Nations Secretary-General. The Committee met at least once a week. A
Technical Task Force composed of the heads of the elections units of the
four Observer Missions also met regularly and interacted with IEC officials
under the chairmanship of the Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General. The Joint Operations Unit (JOU), comprising
representatives of the four Observer Missions, prepared a training and
deployment plan for the large number of International Electoral Observers
(IEOs) deployed during the elections and developed data banks for
systematically recording and maintaining information collected by
observers. The Co-ordinating Committee also met regularly with the
chairman of the electoral Commission. At these meetings reports submitted
by missions observer teams in all provinces were brought to the IEC's
attention.
18. ASSESSMENT OF THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS
In terms of the mandate of UNOMSA and its obligations under
resolution 894 to monitor the work of the IEC, in particular the issuing of
identity documents, voter education, conduct of voting and counting of
votes and the freeness and fairness of the election, UNOMSA submitted its
conclusions and observations to the Secretary-General. 82 In the very short
82 See, A Democratic, Non Racial and United South Africa, Final Report of the United
Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the United Nations
Secretary-General, 26 May 1994.
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period, the IEC achieved an extraordinary feat in the work they did to
prepare for the elections. UNOMSA shared with the IEC its observations
on the electoral process, in order to enhance the Commission's ability to
detect and resolve difficulties. The IEC was receptive to UNOMSA's
comments, which were always offered in a constructive and supportive
spirit. While a great deal was achieved by the IEC in a short space of time,
shortcomings in its performance were identified and brought to its
attention. There were delays in appointing staff to conduct elections which
impacted negatively at election time. There also were delays in the
identification of polling stations. Voter education - although concentrated
in urban and peri-urban areas - reached the majority of South Africans. The
high voter turn out, low number of spoilt ballots (0.99%), and the fact that
in most areas most voters proceeded smoothly through the process
indicated that most people had been motivated and adequately informed
about voting procedures. 83 With regard to identity cards, notwithstanding
the problem of violence in some areas, by the time of the election it was
clear that in most parts of the country, major and substantial efforts had
been made to ensure that voters were given a proper opportunity to obtain
the documents they required.
On the conduct of the elections, in most parts of the country voting went
smoothly. Shortages were experienced in supplies of ballot boxes, ballot
papers, ultra violet lights and invisible ink. In response, the IEC attempted
to redeploy materials, obtain additional ultra violet lights from Lesotho, had
additional ink manufactured and printed additional ballot papers. Counting
of votes took longer than expected and some centres reported confusion and
delays in the counting of votes. UNOMSA concluded that the coverage of
the process by the print media and broadcasting was balanced and did not
disadvantage any political party. The elections were not without
irregularities. There were a number of reported incidents of IEC officials or
monitors canvassing for a particular party among voters waiting in the
queue KwaZulu/Natal presented most of the problems. In parts of the
province some polling officials allowed obviously underage residents to
cast their votes. At most stations in IFP strongholds, only IFP and NP
agents were able to operate. The ANC party agents were too scared for their
lives to be present. In rural parts of Kwazulu/Natal pressure was applied by
traditional leaders on voters polling officials. Some of the polling officials
in KwaZulu/Natal were government officials and indunas (headmen) who
were linked to the Kwazulu Government which in turn was aligned to the
IFP. There were also reports of private voting stations being opened by IFP
83 Ibid.
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supporters who had allegedly seized supplies from legitimate voting
stations.8
4
Even in the best of circumstances, meeting the deadline set for the
organisation and conduct of the first South African elections - four months
- would have been a monumental and daunting task and bound to encounter
substantial organisational challenges. 85 The IEC preparatory work was
seriously affected by the unavailability of adequate data on the size of the
potential voting population in the absence of a national census before the
elections. The absence of a register of eligible voters - noters voted on the
basis of the possession of a variety of South African identity documents and
special voter cards for those without identity documents - exacerbated the
logistical challenges facing the IEC, making it difficult to estimate the
likely demands upon individual voting stations and reducing the controls
over possible abuse. The lack of a voters register also made the
identification of voters at voting stations more onerous. The right of the
voter to cast a vote any where in the country provided flexibility, but
created considerable problems in the provision of materials for voting
stations. After careful consideration of the numerous issues pointed out
above relating to the shortcomings of the conduct of the elections,
UNOMSA together with the Commonwealth, EU and the OAU pronounced
the voting as having been free and the outcome of the elections as
"reflecting the will of the people of South Africa". 86 The Missions carefully
avoided using the term "free and fair" as there was disagreement among the
observer missions on the appropriateness of the term in the context of the
circumstances of the South African elections. At the Conclusion of the
process the Security Council on 27 June 1994 closed its chapter on South
Africa. In resolution 930 of 27 June 1994 after considering the final report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in South
Africa (UNOMSA) (S/1994/717) it resolved after "noting with great
satisfaction the establishment of a united non-racial and democratic
government of South Africa", decided that it had concluded its
consideration of the item "the question of South Africa" and resolved to





86 See, Joint Final Statement by the heads of International Observer Missions, 6 May
1994. See also statement issued by the Missions at the close of voting, 30 April 1994.
87 Security Council resolution, S/RES/930/ (1994), 27 June 1994
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CONCLUSION
The United Nations has been or is presently involved in other political
transformation processes in Africa. Some more successful than others. In
Sub Saharan Africa there have been both failures and successes. Angola (in
its first phase) and Somalia represent failures while Namibia, Mozambique
and South Africa represent successes. The outcome of each mission can be
explained to a large extent by the mandate and the conditions under which
it operated. In Namibia, the United Nations was requested to supervise the
whole independence process of the country, including the elections. The
plan for the elections had been elaborated since 1978. The Representative
of the Secretary-General had practically a veto power on every decision
related to the independence process. In Angola, an independent country, the
United Nations had only been requested, after the verification of the cease-
fire arrangements, to observe and verify the elections. In addition, while in
Namibia it was possible to totally demobilise the South African and
SWAPO troops prior to the elections, this had not been achieved in Angola
leaving open the possibility of the resumption of the armed conflict. In
Mozambique the United Nations was involved in elections, verification of
the withdrawal of troops, demobilisation of troops and related measures.
The Mission was able to demobilise the Government and RENAMO troops
and form a joint army. After initial hesitation on the part of RENAMO, the
elections were accepted by all parties.
South Africa was successful because UNOMSA had the advantage of
working with a flexible mandate. The international community was united
in its views on South Africa and on the objectives of UNOMSA. Many
international conflicts have been worsened by divisions among the
countries of the world each having a different objective. In South Africa the
international community played a constructive role. They put pressure on
the political leaders to make the process succeed. 88 Above all, the
overwhelming majority of South Africans wanted to achieve a peaceful
transition. The elections were not a miracle, the settlement was achieved by
the hard work of dedicated South Africans and by the quality of South
African political leadership. 89 The political leaders and political parties
demonstrated remarkable maturity and responsibility and manifested a clear
political will to make negotiations work and obtain consensus. As has so
88 World leaders kept constant touch with political leaders in South Africa and
encouraged them along the transitional process.
89 See, remarks of Justice Johan Kriegler, Chairperson of the Independent Electoral
Commission, Announcement of Certification and the Results of the 1994 South African
Elections, 6 May 1994.
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often been stated peace can not be imposed on a people that do not desire it.
It can only be facilitated for parties that wish to achieve peace. Throughout
the transitional process, the South African leaders stayed on course,
reaching deep into their own reserves of energy and imagination and
relying on themselves rather than outsiders to overcome obstacles to the
process. South Africans tried among themselves to solve their problems,
which led to a great degree of trust being established at the grassroots level.
It must also, however, be recognised that South Africa was fortunate in that
the international climate had changed with the end of the cold war. It was
the right moment to engage in a process of negotiations for an end to
apartheid. The withdrawal of Cuba from Angola and the independence of
Namibia can also be singled out as important events in this regard.
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